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1Capital structure and managerial compensation: the eﬀects of remuneration
seniority
Abstract
We show that the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has
important implications on the design of remuneration contracts. Whereas the
traditional literature assumes that debt is senior to remuneration, we show that
this is frequently not the case according to bankruptcy regulation and as observed
in practice. We theoretically show that including risky debt changes the incen-
tive to provide the manager with stronger performance-related incentives (“con-
tract substitution” eﬀect). If managerial compensation has priority over the debt
claims, higher leverage produces lower power-incentive schemes (lower bonuses)
and a higher base salary. With junior compensation, we expect more emphasis
on pay-for-performance incentives. The empirical ﬁndings are in line with the
regime of remuneration seniority as the base salary is signiﬁcantly higher and the
performance bonus is lower in ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.
21 Introduction
During the 1990s, the use of performance-related compensation packages (based on direct
ownership participation) increased dramatically (Murphy (1999)). Financial economists usu-
ally consider these forms of managerial compensation as the consequence of a rational attempt
by shareholders to reduce the agency problems ﬁrst illustrated by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
The contemporaneous increase in the leverage of Anglo-American corporations has also stim-
ulated interest in the role of debt as a direct incentive device for the management to generate
stronger corporate performance (Baker and Wruck (1989), Smith and Watts (1992)).
In this paper, we study the link between remuneration contracts and debt and, more
speciﬁcally, examine whether debt and incentive bonuses related to the ﬁrm performance are
complementary in curbing agency conﬂicts between shareholders and managers. We show
that including risky debt in the capital structure changes the "incentive to give incentives"
by a principal in charge of managerial contracts. This principal usually is the compensation
committee of the board of directors. Moreover, we show that the eﬀect of debt on managers’
remuneration depends on the relative priority with which the two claims would be paid if
insolvency were to occur.
The question about the relative seniority of debt and remuneration is an important issue
which has largely been ignored in the literature. For example, Innes (1990), Hart and Moore
(1995), Berkovitch, Israel and Spiegel (2000) and Hart and Moore (1995) recognize that
only "hard" (that is, senior and non-postponable) debt plays an important role in reducing
managerial discretion. The only exception to this approach is John and John (1993), who
study the relation between the design of optimal top-management compensation and the
capital structure when salary has priority on debt, but with asymmetric information between
the manager and the principal-shareholder. However, in reality, it is not always the case that
managerial remuneration is junior to debt claims. Such an assumption may be acceptable for
countries with pure liquidation bankruptcy codes, but cannot be generalized. The bankruptcy
procedures of countries like the US, UK, Germany etc. make the seniority issue a complex
problem. Let us ﬁrst illustrate this point using UK (and US) regulation.
When a UK ﬁrm is insolvent and will be liquidated, the number of claims with preferential
status is limited to payroll taxes, VAT and arrears in wages. These last claims are conﬁned to
those held by employees (excluding directors), and to GBP 800. Thus, top managers’ claims
based on salary and bonuses are not senior; they are part of the pool of unsecured claims and
hence junior to all preferential debt (the ﬂoating and ﬁxed debentures). The assumption in
the theoretical literature that managerial remuneration is junior to all debt claims does not
completely tie in with the insolvency practice of a liquidation code but is suﬃciently close.
However, there are many cases in which the managerial remuneration claims are senior to
leverage.
First, in case of insolvency, the holder of a ﬂoating charge (for a more detailed discussion of
UK bankruptcy, see Appendix B) can appoint a receiver who will liquidate the ﬁrm’s ﬂoating
assets on his behalf. However, instead of liquidating the ﬁrm, the receiver can also exercise
another option: he can continue the business if the proceeds of continuation are expected to
exceed those of a liquidation. If this were the case, the managerial remuneration contracts
(and the arrears remuneration and bonuses) remain valid. A continuation of the business
(taken out of the corporate shell) or sale to a third party triggers the “Transfer of undertakings
3protection of employment” regulations of 1981 (TUPE) which stems from the European
Acquired Rights directive. This regulation states that "all the [seller’s] rights , powers, duties
and liabilities under or in connection with [an employee’s contract of employment], shall
be transferred to the [buyer]." Furthermore, the buyer assumes liability for "anything done
before the transfer is completed by or in relation to the [seller] in respect of that contract
or a person employed in that undertaking or part". TUPE states that such an act "shall be
deemed to have been done by or in relation to the [buyer]."
Second, another possibility is that the receiver sells one line of business to pay the secured
creditors. At that point, the receiver ceases to act (he only works on behalf of the holders of
the ﬂoating charge). If the ﬁrm is subsequently no longer insolvent, the company is again in
the hands of the directors whose remuneration contracts remain valid.
Third, an alternative (in the UK) to the above creditor-oriented receivership is the debtor-
oriented ‘administration’ procedure. In this case, the court supervises a formal workout
(ﬁnancial and/or asset restructuring) with the aim of corporate survival. If the incumbent
management is essential for the ﬁrm and is maintained after the implementation of the
reorganization plan, the claims of past remuneration may still remain valid (or may even
be increased). This happened, for example, in the collapse of Barings bank. Likewise, “E&Y,
which was appointed as administrator for Railtrack in October 2001 [ ...] ,t o o kt h ed e c i s i o n
to pay Richard Middleton £700,000 for six months’ work to prevent him from leaving the
t r o u b l e d r a i l g r o u p .[ ...]M r M i d d l e t o n w a s o n e o f t h r e e d i r e c t o r s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e
network’s safety. E&Y feared that, without his expertise, the network could be plunged into
chaos. The engineer, who was involved in the disastrous upgrade of the West Coast Main
Line, received a pay rise that included a doubling of his salary of £168,000, a hefty retention
bonus and a year’s salary for loss of oﬃce” (The Times, 23 June 2003).
As a US example, the Regus case shows that in a formal workout, the employees’ remu-
neration contracts (including bonuses) are preserved1 in spite of very poor past performance
resulting in insolvency and Chapter 1 (the US equivalent to UK administration (Franks and
Torous (2002))).
Fourth, there are numerous cases which show that management foresees insolvency and
still manages to time the payment of substantial bonuses such that its remuneration is ef-
fectively senior to debt claims (by paying them out shortly before the corporate collapse).
For instance, EuroTelecom collapsed in February 2001, eleven months after raising GBP 15
1“Regus PLC which ﬁled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy[...],isaskingabankruptcycourttoallowittomake
retention and severance payments to keep selected employees on board while it reorganizes. The company said
the value of its business "cannot be preserved and maximized for the creditors’ beneﬁt without the employees
criticaltotheoperationofthosebusinesses"[...] Thecompanyisalsoseekingtoestablishageneralpoolof
$100,000 for discretionary bonuses to workers not initially covered under the plan. According to the motion,
the plan would allow Regus to pay its four most senior U.S. corporate executives [...] half their bonuses,
equal to 20% of their base salaries [...]. The remaining bonuses, also equal to 20% of salaries, would be paid
by Jan. 31, 2004, subject to a performance review [...]. The company would also assume the executives’
current employment contracts, which call for potential bonuses of up to 40% of their salaries. Regus has also
proposed to pay the executives one year’s base salary as severance plus all deferred or unpaid beneﬁts under
the plan. (Dow Jones Corporate Filings Alert, 15 January 2003).
4million through an AIM ﬂotation2. Likewise, the UK management of Enron3 and of NTL4
cashed in their bonuses shortly before the collapse. Alternatively, in the wake of a corporate
crash, top management can make the ﬁrm sign a new contract including generous severance
payments (as in the Marconi case5).
Not only the evidence above supports the idea that debt is often "soft" compared to man-
agerial compensation. Firms are sometimes able to keep parts of their subsidiary’s proﬁts out
of reach of creditors. For example in the case of the bankruptcy ﬁling of the US utility Paciﬁc
Gas and Electric it became clear that its proﬁts were transferred to its subsidiary National
Energy Group, allowing the management to enjoy performance bonuses even in a situation
very close to ﬁnancial distress of one subsidiary. “Paciﬁc Gas and Electric transferred $ 4.1
billion between 1997 and 1999. Most of this went to dividends and stock repurchases, but $
838 million was invested in other subsidiaries, primarily its National Energy Group unit. [.
. . ] ‘Executives of the companies say the transfers were proper. Audits have shown that
“we followed the rules and didn’t do anything wrong” (‘While a Utility May Be Failing, Its
Owner is Not’, The New York Times, 30 April 2001)6.
These are only some of the numerous cases in which top management is able to safe-
guard their base salary and bonuses by timing those payments well, by relating bonuses to
the performance of subsidiaries where performance is amassed (at the expense of other sub-
sidiaries) or by redesigning contracts (with substantial severance payments) even when the
ﬁrm is close to insolvency. The research question as to how the relative seniority structure
of managerial compensation and debt contracts determine the managerial incentives consti-
tutes a contribution to the theoretical literature as this has — to our knowledge — not been
addressed. Therefore, in this paper we theoretically analyze and empirically test the eﬀect of,
respectively, senior and junior debt on the choice of managerial incentive contracts (assuming
the ﬁnancing decision is taken prior to managerial contract negotiation). We show that the
pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases with leverage, while the base salary increases with
leverage, when debt is considered to be junior to compensation in case the ﬁrm enters a
bankruptcy procedure. With senior debt, we ﬁnd opposite relations.
These results are obtained from the following principles. First, at the moment of designing
2“[The BDO accountants] disclose[s] that on November 6, 2000 three cheques of GBP 50,000 were made out
and entered in the cash book as "directors’ bonuses in favour of" Mr Derry, Mr Linell and another director,
Andy Krawchuk”. (The Guardian, 31 March 2001).
3“Senior executives at the London subsidiary of collapsed US energy trader Enron received at least GBP
500,000 in cash bonuses weeks before it went into administration.” (Scotland on Sunday, 24 March 2002).
4“Barclay Knapp, the chief executive of the troubled cable company NTL, was awarded a $561,138
(£382,768) bonus for his work in 2001 as the company lurched towards bankruptcy” (The Independent, 31
May 2002).
5Lord Simpson of Dunkeld (CEO) managed to extract a severance pay of GBP 2.2 million. “It was hardly
news, in August, that Marconi was in trouble. Simpson knew this when he entered into negotiations with
those supine non-executives on the remuneration committee. So did they. But both parties signed.” (The
Times, 29 September 2001).
6Consider Global Crossing: “[T]he US telecoms giant’s board signed what must be among the most generous
employment contracts of all time. On joining the company, Robert Annunziata, chief executive, was handed
a$ 10 million (Euro 12 million) signing bonus, options on two million shares with an exercise price $10b e l o w
market value, and "guaranteed annual bonus" worth another $500,000. His contract also speciﬁed the make
and model of Mercedes the company would purchase for him, sanctioned the use of the corporate jet, and
agreed to pay for ﬁrst class air travel for his entire family, including his mother. Annunziata lasted 53 weeks
in the job, but amassed no less than $151m in pay. As has now become clear, the board’s pay policy failed to
buy performance” (The Financial News, 4 February 2002).
5the compensation package, the existing capital structure determines the “incentive to give
incentives” by the remuneration committee of the board of directors when it acts in the
interest of the existing shareholders: this eﬀect by itself changes the optimal contract a
shareholder-principal oﬀers the managers for diﬀerent levels of debt in the capital structure.
Secondly, for a given level of leverage, the degree of protection of the management pay against
creditors’ claims on corporate value changes the payment the manager would receive in the
case of insolvency. Therefore, the relative seniority of debt versus compensation inﬂuences
the management’s incentives to put eﬀort into the ﬁrm.
T h ef a c tt h a tc o m pe n s a t i o ni sp a i dw i t hp r i o r i t yo v e rt h ed e b tc l a i m si ft h eﬁrm is insolvent
has two implications. First, the base salary is partly paid by the debtholders whenever the
ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress: the shareholders do not suﬀe rt h ee n t i r ec o s to fo ﬀering a high
base salary to the management. Secondly, higher managerial eﬀort decreases the likelihood
the ﬁrm will be insolvent, thus increasing the value of debt claims. Why then should the
shareholders, who enjoy positive proﬁts only in good states of the world, give up a substantial
part of these proﬁt si nt h ef o r mo fh i g hi n c e n t i v eb o n u s e sw h e np a r to ft h ea d v a n t a g eo ft h e
higher eﬀort will be cashed-in by the debtholders? The consequence of these two eﬀects
is that shareholder-principal oﬀers the agent-manager a lower performance bonus in highly
levered ﬁrms.
On the contrary, when the base salary is subordinated (i.e. junior) to debtholders’ claims
in a bankruptcy procedure, leverage acts as a direct incentive device to enforce higher man-
agerial eﬀort, as in Innes (1990), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Hart and Moore (1995) (the
so-called "incentive eﬀect"). This is because the agent-manager payment in the low state of
the world is bounded above by the presence of senior debt, forcing her to a choice of high
eﬀort. This can be implemented only through the payment of higher incentive bonus. On the
other hand, under this regime, leverage reduces the resources free from debt service which can
then be allocated to the management (Berkovitch, Israel and Spiegel (2000): the "cash-ﬂow
eﬀect"). For some levels of debt the incentive eﬀect prevails over the cash-ﬂow eﬀect, so that
the principal has to reward the management with a greater bonus as leverage increases. In
this sense, we prove that "hard" debt and junior incentives are complementary.
We also test the theoretical predictions of our model empirically using a sample selection
model (type-2 Tobit model). The selection equation selects the ﬁrms where a new CEO has
been appointed and the regression equation captures the relation between the CEOs mone-
tary remuneration and pre-existing debt. As the relative seniority of debt and performance
contracts are especially important in case of ﬁnancial distress, we pay special attention to sub-
samples of poorly performing ﬁr m s .S t u d y i n gaU Kd a t ap a n e lo v e r1988-93 (pre-Greenbury),
for which we cannot distinguish between base salary and performance bonus, we ﬁnd a posi-
tive relation between total remuneration and lagged leverage for poorly performing ﬁrms in
ﬁnancial distress. However, from a second sample of the 510 largest UK ﬁrms by market cap-
italization in 1997-98 (post-Greenbury) we observe that the base salary is signiﬁcantly higher
for poorly performing ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress, while the performance bonus is lower. The
net eﬀect of total monetary remuneration is (marginally) positive (as for the pre-Greenbury
period). These ﬁndings conﬁrm our predictions in the case where remuneration is eﬀectively
senior to debt contracts, as we have motivated with the insolvency regulation and the cases
above.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model. In
section 3, we study the choice of managerial remuneration contract by the shareholders in
6the two diﬀerent cases of seniority of (a) the manager remuneration claims and (b) the debt
claims. In section 4, we collect the empirically testable implications of the model. Section
5 describes the data and methodology of the empirical study and section 6 discusses the
empirical results. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A collects the proofs while appendix B
details the UK bankruptcy procedures.
2 The model
Consider a ﬁrm operating in two periods t =1 ,2. At date t =1 , a principal P (typically the
remuneration committee of the board of directors) oﬀers a contract specifying a compensation
scheme to a manager A and then delegates the business activity to him. As in the standard
principal-agent model, the principal cannot monitor the manager’s actions, but he can exactly
observe the realization of the ﬁrm cash ﬂows at t =2and verify it through a legal procedure.
Hence, the principal can write contracts upon that realization of cash ﬂows. P oﬀers A as t a t e -
contingent, complete contract w(q) specifying the payment she will get at the ﬁnal date t =2
for any realized cash ﬂow e q. We allow her to compensate the agent only through monetary
payments, excluding any other form of remuneration (shares or option plans, promotions or
perks).
We will consider a risk-neutral principal and a risk averse agent. If the manager accepts
the contract at t =1 , he then chooses a non-veriﬁable eﬀort level, e in an interval Λ =[ 0 ,e],
that aﬀects the probability distribution of the ﬁnal cash ﬂows. We assume for simplicity
that, at t =2 ,t h eﬁrm can only produce a high cash-ﬂow q1 or a lower cash ﬂow q0
7 without
any earnings maturing at time one. For the moment, we assume that the capital structure
is given at the moment of the contract negotiation and that the manager cannot change this
pre-existing capital structure anymore subsequently. Still, in section 3, we discuss how the
results change when this assumption is removed and the hired manager is able to change the
capital structure at date t =1 .
At the last stage, the realized cash-ﬂow of the ﬁrm (qi)i=0,1 is distributed to the diﬀerent
claimholders (including the agent) according to their respective claims and following a pre-
speciﬁed, law-enforced rule of priority.
Assumption 1: The cash-ﬂow of the ﬁrm at t =2is a two-states random variable
distributed according to p(e)=P r ( q1;e) where p(e) i sa s s u m e dt ob ec o n t i n u o u si ne, weakly
increasing and weakly concave.
Assuming that p(e) is weakly increasing and concave guarantees that both Monotone Like-
lihood Ratio Property (MLRP) and Cumulative Distribution Function Convexity (CDFC)8
7If the ﬁrm has liquid assets-in-place L at time zero, which can be turned into cash at t =2 , and whose
market value at time 2 is independent of managerial eﬀort, we include them in q. Hence, q is a composite
measure of both the ﬁrm liquid assets-in-place and project cash-ﬂows, with the diﬀerence that the t =2value
of the latter is aﬀected by the eﬀort the manager chooses previously.
8The MLRP holds if the likelihood ratio
pi(e)
pi(e0) is non-decreasing in the state i, given any two actions e,e
0




The CDFC requires that the distribution function P(q,e) is convex in the action e.
7properties are veriﬁed9, so that we can be sure that the ﬁrst-order condition of the agent
problem only picks up global optima (Holmstrom (1979), Rogerson (1985)).
All the information about the ﬁrm returns and the contract with the agent is commonly
known at time 1 by all individuals.
We make the following assumption on the preferences of the agent:
Assumption 2: The agent’s utility function is separable in eﬀort and compensation,
U(e,w(y)) = (u(w1)p(e)+u(w0)(1−p(e))−c(e) where c(e) is increasing, twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and strictly convex in e. Moreover, c0 > 0,c 00 > 0, c(0) = 0, c0(0) = 0.
The solution of the model involves two subsequent steps: at t =1t h ec h o i c eo ft h e
optimal remuneration contract by the principal P; and successively the optimal eﬀort choice
by the agent A once he has signed the contract. Since the individuals are perfectly rational
and have complete knowledge of the model, we can analyze the sequence of the events by
working recursively. We ﬁrst describe the agent’s choice of eﬀort.
Given the state-contingent, complete contract (w0,w 1), A solves the following problem:
max
e∈[0,e]
u(w1)p(e)+u(w0)(1 − p(e)) − c(e) (A)
At time t =1 , the principal P (the remuneration committee) chooses the contract that
maximizes the shareholders’ value: in doing this she has to take as given the incentive com-
patibility constraint (IC) generated by the unobservable choice of eﬀort by the agent.
Let D ≥ 0 be the face value of the existing debt in the capital structure of the ﬁrm with






p(e)u(w1)+( 1− p(e))u(w0) − c(e) ≥ U (IR)
e(wi) is the solution to (A) given w∗
i (IC)








where IR is the participation constraint for the agent.
2.1 Some properties of the principal-agent relationship
By assumption 1 on p(e), we can substitute the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) with
the ﬁrst order condition (f.o.c.) in the eﬀort choice whenever IC is binding11 (Rogerson
(1985)). Given the contract payments (w0,w 1) the agent solves:
9See Result A in the Appendix for a formal proof of this statement.
10Given that the information is symmetrically distributed across all individuals, all the investors can antic-
ipate rationally the decisions of P and A and can then correctly price their claims on the ﬁrm payoﬀs. With
no discount and risk-neutrality all the claims are priced under the risk-neutral probability p(e).
11In our framework IC is not binding for the implementation of e =0 :i nt h a tc a s eP can fully insure A
paying a ﬁxed wage w
fi at which IR is binding (Grossman and Hart (1983)).
8e ∈ argmax p(b e)u(w1)+( 1− p(b e))u(w0)
 e∈[0,e]
and the global maximum is characterized by:
p0(e)(u(w1) − u(w0)) = c0(e) (1)
The characterization of the choice of eﬀort by the agent allows us to determine some
properties of the optimal contract problem.
Assumption 3: U>
c0(e)








p0(e) (1 − p(e))
´
>q 0.
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1,2, and 3, for any e ∈ [0,e]:
(i) IR is always binding, and each action can be induced with positive payments to the
agent; moreover, the higher the agent’s reservation price for action e, (in the sense of higher
CFB(e)), the (weakly) higher w1, and the (weakly) lower w0 necessary to implement such an
action e.
(ii) for any given action e>0 implemented by P, a higher w0 requires a higher bonus
b = w1 − w0 that the principal has to pay to the agent in state q1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Corollary 2 (co-monotonicity of payoﬀso f A and P): a compensation scheme (w0(e),w 1(e))
satisfying IR and s.t. w0(e) >w 1(e) is never optimal for P whenever q1−w1(e) >q 0−w0(e).
Moreover, when w1(e) >w 0(e) we have q1 − w1(e) >q 0 − w0(e).
Proof: See Grossman and Hart (1983), Proposition 4.
Assumption 3 and Lemma 1 have two important consequences: ﬁrst, they guarantee that
adding a limited liability constraint on the agent does not change our results: for all actions
e ∈ [0,e] the agent always receives a positive payment in both states; secondly, they allow us
to order the set of payments the principal has to oﬀer in order to induce any action e:
0 <q 0 − w
fi
0 <q 0 − wmin
0 <q 0
0 <q 1 − wmax
1 <q 1 − w
fi
1 <q 1
2.2 The optimal contract in an all-equity ﬁrm
If no debt with maturity t =2is present in the capital structure of the ﬁrm at the moment
of the contract negotiation, the principal solves the following problem at t =1 :
e0 ∈ argmax
e












p0(e) (1 − p(e))
´ (2)
9where the function h denotes u−1.
Assumption 4 The utility function of the agent and the probability p(e) are such that
−p(e)h(U + c(e)+
c0(e)
p0(e) (1 − p(e))) is concave in e ∈ [0,e].
Under Assumption 1-4 this problem is a concave problem (Laﬀont and Martimort (1999))





where CSB(e) is the cost for the principal to implement action e under moral hazard (second-
best cost): CSB(e)=p(e)w1(e)+( 1− p(e))w0(e).
Proposition 1: The optimal contract under full-equity ﬁnancing induces the eﬀort e0








Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 allows us to ﬁx the benchmark solution of the optimal contract in the case
of full-equity ﬁnancing of the ﬁrm. We now move to check how the presence of debt in the
capital structure aﬀects the choice of contract by the principal.
3 The relative seniority of compensation versus debt
Since the equity claims are junior to both debt and to managerial monetary compensation,
the equityholders receive a positive payment only in case the ﬁrm payoﬀ qi exceeds wi + D,
regardless of the relative seniority of debt and remuneration. It is easy to see that the
Principal’s objective function in (P) changes in a non-linear way with D, the debt due at
t =2 12. Therefore, it is clear that the optimal contract (w∗
i) chosen by P will depend on
D.W e c a l l t h i s e ﬀect of capital structure on the managerial compensation the “contract
substitution”e ﬀect.
In this section, we show that the relation between the optimal remuneration contract and
leverage depends on the relative degree of law-enforced seniority of the compensation ver-
sus debt. In many existing papers on managerial compensation (Innes (1990), Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994), Robe (1999), Berkovitch, Israel and Spiegel (2000)), the management
remuneration is considered junior to the debt claims. Such an assumption does not com-
pletely tie in with reality as the introduction demonstrates. Our objective here is not to
discuss whether top-management compensation is junior or senior to debt in case of (near-
)bankruptcy procedure as this ﬁrstly depends upon the chosen bankruptcy procedure (a
debtor- or a creditor-oriented procedure) and secondly may even diﬀer from case to case
within a speciﬁc procedure. Instead, we intend to show that this relative seniority is the
all-important variable to understand the eﬀect of leverage on compensation.
12With a continuum set of states higher leverage reduces the states in which equity value is positive, making
the function (qi − w
∗
i − D) convex in the states i.
103.1 Debt is subordinated to managerial compensation
With managerial remuneration being senior to debt, the agent’s problem (A) is not aﬀected
by D: the f.o.c. (1)h o l d sf o ra n yD>0 as well. What matters for the choice of the optimal
contract is only the change in the payoﬀ function for the principal.
Suppose that in the pre-existing capital structure of the ﬁrm there is debt D>0 that
has to be repaid at t =2 . The payoﬀ function of P at t =1becomes:
p(e)max{q1 − w1 − D;0} +( 1− p(e))max{q0 − w0 − D;0}
= Ben(e;D) − CSB(e)
where
Ben(e;D)=p(e)max{q1 − D;w1} +( 1− p(e))max{q0 − D;w0}
CSB(e)=p(e)w1 +( 1− p(e))w0
Ben(e;D) is the beneﬁt for the principal when action e is induced, while CSB(e) is the
second-best cost for implementing such action. The fact that the agent’s problem is invariant
to D has an important consequence: a positive D does not create any direct incentive eﬀect on
the agent’s eﬀort. However, our purpose is to characterize how the solution of the following
problem changes with D>0:
max












p0(e) (1 − p(e))
´
Proposition 2: If the agent’s compensation is due with priority over the debt service in
time 2 and if the solution of problem (2) is e0 > 0,t h e n ,f o rD>q 0 the solution of (4) is
eD <e 0, wD
0 >w 0
0, and the bonus paid in presence of debt wD
1 − wD
0 = bD <w 0
1 − w0
0 = b0.
When risky debt is issued, the relative payoﬀ of shareholders changes across states. They
end up not paying the agent’s compensation entirely in the low state as the ﬁxed part, w0,
is partly paid by the debtholders in the case of insolvency. Proposition 2 suggests that the
shareholder-principal transfers part of the cost of the remuneration contract to the debthold-
ers through a higher base salary w0 and a lower bonus. The cost of such a bonus accrues
entirely to the shareholders but it produces beneﬁts that they cannot fully internalize, since
they are partly cashed-in by the debtholders. Furthermore, an increase of w0 has a negative
eﬀect on the managerial eﬀort (Lemma 1). Hence, if the management’s compensation is
protected against the debtors’ claims, a principal P acting in the interest of existing share-
holders will choose a lower pay-to-performance sensitivity contract, since the marginal cost
of the bonus is now higher for that principal. Implicitly, he oﬀers an insurance to agent A
(the manager) at the expense of the debtholders.
According to Proposition 2, we should observe low-powered incentive contracts under this
regime in ﬁrms with risky debt. We will test this empirical prediction in section 6; Smith
and Watts (1992) conﬁrm it in ﬁrms using traditional, monetary compensation packages.
11Finally, note that the result of Proposition 2 does not change when we allow the manager
to change the capital structure at time 1. The intuition is simple: when the managerial
remuneration is totally senior to debt, any variation of the capital structure posterior to the
contract negotiation has no eﬀect on the utility the agent-manager gets at the optimum,
making her indiﬀerent towards the debt level.
3.2 Managerial remuneration is subordinated to debt
In the present model the ﬁrm is insolvent if at time t =2the debt service and the managers’
compensation exceed the generated cash ﬂows. This is the case if the bad contingent state
occurs and hence the cash ﬂow is below the payments due (q0 <D+ w0). The debtholders
can now start a bankruptcy procedure that leads to the liquidation of the ﬁrms’ assets. If
the existing law does not give a preferential status to the managers’ pay in case the ﬁrm is
liquidated, we can assume that, the remuneration of the manager cannot exceed the amount
q0 − D13.
This legal regime implies that the wage the agent receives in state zero is directly aﬀected
by the amount of debt D because the principal is protected by limited liability. This principal
cannot credibly oﬀer a compensation w0 >q 0 − D since the agent knows he will not be able
to claim more than q0 − D in case of liquidation.
The presence of risky debt14 creates then two eﬀects on the choice of contract (as pointed
out by Berkovitch, Israel and Spiegel (2000)15):
1) an “incentive eﬀect”: the debt D puts an upper bound on the wage the principal can
(credibly) promise to the agent in a state with q0 : w0 ≤ q0 − D. Following from Lemma 1,
the principal has to pay a higher w1 to make the agent accept the contract and induce high
levels of eﬀort;
2) a “cash-ﬂow” eﬀect: higher D reduces the cash-ﬂow in s =1available for compensation.
As the maximum possible bonus b is now lower, the principal P will be less able to induce
higher eﬀort from the agent by means of bonus compensation.
As it is never optimal for P t oi m p l e m e n ta na m o u n to fe ﬀort e>0 that requires the
payment of a bonus to the agent of w1−w0 >q 1−q0,w eﬁnd (Corollary 2) for any D ≥ 0 that
q1 − w1 − D ≥ q0 − w0 − D. This in turn implies that by increasing D we enter successively
in the following regions:
(i) e0 is such that q1 − w1 − D ≥ q0 − w0 − D ≥ 0;
(ii) e0 would require a payment w0(e0) >q 0−D so that q1−w0
1−D ≥ 0 and q0−w0
0−D<0
(iii) e0 is such that D ≥ q1 − w0
1;
In the ﬁrst case, the optimal contract for the principal does not change with D: the debt
is riskless.
13Of course, the ﬁrm is also insolvent if D + w1 >q 1. We will study the two cases separately.
14Risky debt is deﬁned as debt which cannot be repaid when the state which yields q0 is realized: D>q 0.
15Our analysis is diﬀerent from theirs since they only study the case of junior wage compensation along
with the choice of optimal managerial turnover.
12In case (ii),t h ea c t i o ne0 is not implementable with any junior wage scheme because the
principal cannot credibly oﬀer the agent more than q0−D. While the agent’s limited liability
constraint16 puts a lower bound on the compensation, D imposes an upper bound on w0.
In case (iii), the principal cannot credibly pay more than q1−D in the good contingency,
and this puts an upper bound on the maximum compensation w1.
Proposition 3. If the agent compensation is subordinated to the debt service at time 2
then eD ≥ eSB(0) and w1(eD)−w0(eD) ≥ w1(e0)−w0(e0) for D ∈ [q0 −w0(e0),min{q0,q 1 −
w1(e0)[.
If managerial compensation is not protected against the debtholders claims, the optimal
bonus is increasing in leverage. This occurs because debt acts as a direct incentive device
( a si nI n n e s( 1990)), and the participation constraint of the agent forces the principal to pay
him a higher bonus, even if this is suboptimal. Leverage and junior power-incentives are then
complementary.
If we allow the agent to adjust the capital structure by issuing or retiring debt and equity
after the contract has been signed (i.e. at t =1 ), the problem becomes more complex. Still,
we can observe the following: once the contract has been signed, the manager A will try
to postpone the debt repayment in order to increase the resources qi − D available for his
own compensation. Anticipating this, the principal can aﬀord to oﬀer the manager contracts
requiring higher payments wi. Still, the result in Proposition 3 will hold albeit with a caveat:
the debt D represents the ﬁnal debt service, net of the change of the capital structure the
manager performs at t =1 .
3.3 The optimal capital structure
Throughout the paper, we assume that the principal acts in the interest of existing sharehold-
ers and that she maximizes the total value of the ﬁrm. From this follows immediately that
all-equity ﬁnancing is always optimal in our setup with perfect capital markets (no taxes, no
asymmetry of information). However, debt is used in most ﬁrms due to tax advantages or
commitment problems.
In our model, we take a capital structure with debt as given. We also accept that the
capital structure is ﬁxed at the moment of the negotiation of the remuneration contracts. The
reason is that we want to highlight the eﬀects of pre-existing debt on the new remuneration
contracts. This assumption of a ﬁxed capital structure at the moment of contract negotiations
is not unreasonable: ﬁrms are on-going economic entities in which managerial contracts are
frequently renewed, renegotiated, or created, whereas the decisions about the optimal capital
structure are of a more strategic nature and hence occur less frequently. However, it is still
worthwhile to ask the question as to how ﬁrm value and managerial eﬀort would change with
capital structure changing over time
We can point out the diﬀerences in results between the case with no change in capital
structure as discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 and the case with a possible change in capital
16While we impose limited liability on the principal throughout our model, the condition of limited liability
on the agent (no remuneration punishments) is always satisﬁed following assumption 3, in line with standard
principal-agent models (Laﬀo n ta n dM a r t i m o r t( 1999)).
13structure for each of our two seniority regimes. With compensation senior to debt (Proposi-
tion 2), the optimal contract reduces the incentive for the management to exert high eﬀort,
while in the opposite case (Proposition 3) the optimal contract increases managerial eﬀort.
In the latter regime where debt is senior to compensation, our model also predicts higher
leverage because senior, protected debt is then cheaper than junior debt. This follows from
the facts that (i) debt is senior to compensation and (ii) the value of the ﬁrm increases due
to increase in managerial eﬀort.
4 Empirical implications
From our theoretical analysis we derive the following empirically testable predictions, which
we analyze in section 6:
1) The relative seniority of managerial remuneration and debt claims determines the
managerial compensation schemes: when compensation is senior to debt in case of ﬁnancial
distress, higher leverage reduces the power incentives (performance bonus), but increases the
basic salary.
2) If the relative priority of managerial compensation over debtholders’ claims is left
unspeciﬁed, the cost of debt should be higher than in a situation in which such a priority is
legally enforced ex-ante.
Before turning to the description of the empirical methodology and its results, a last
observation should be made. In the model, ﬁrm leverage always referred to risky debt that
is to be repaid at the payoﬀ date t =2 , that is at the moment the agent receives his
compensation. In our setup, we assume that the ﬁrms have no liquid assets already in place.
However, even if this were the case, our analysis would still hold if one considers D as debt
service at t =2net of the liquidation value of the ﬁrm’s assets at t =2 .
5 Data and methodology
5.1 Description of the samples
The ﬁrst sample consists of 250 UK ﬁrms randomly drawn from the population of all com-
panies quoted on the London Stock Exchange, excluding ﬁnancial institutions, real estate
companies and insurance companies17. The data panel extends over the period 1988-93,
which is an interesting period for the following reasons: (i) it captures a recession (in which
substantial performance-related top management replacement can be observed) and (ii) the
data refer to the pre-Cadbury/Greenbury period (which has the advantage that we see more
17We are grateful to Julian Franks, Colin Mayer for providing us with pre-Greenbury data.
14heterogeneity in new managerial contracts than in later periods)18. Thus, this recession pe-
riod is characterized by lower corporate governance standards than more recent years, and is
therefore particularly interesting from an agency-theory point of view. The sample (hence-
forth labeled the ‘pre-Greenbury sample’) also includes those ﬁrms that were taken over or
went bankrupt but have at least 3 years of data available allowing us to capture the dynamics.
As we are particularly interested in managerial compensation contracts in poorly per-
forming and ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms, we create a poor performance-subsample consisting
of those ﬁrms in the above sample that are in the lowest decile of performance measured by
abnormal returns in at least 2 years of the sample period. We extend this subsample (hence-
forth labeled the ‘pre-Greenbury poor performance sample’) by another 50 poorly performing
ﬁrms according to the same criterion. This bringing the total number of poorly performing
ﬁrms to ninety19.
Prior to the introduction of the Greenbury code of conduct on remuneration practices
in 1995-96, some remuneration data (the non-cash elements like stock- and option-grants)
were not available and the detail of reporting was limited (base salary and bonus were not
made public separately). That is why we also use a second sample taken from the post-
Cadbury/Greenbury period in 1997-98 which consists of the 510 largest UK ﬁrms (by market
capitalization)20. This sample is henceforth labeled ‘post-Greenbury sample’ and represents
about 87% of the market capitalization of the London Stock Exchange.
5.2 Data sources and summary statistics
For the pre-Greenbury sample, all data on managerial compensation, turnover and board
composition are retrieved from the Directors’ Report and the Notes in the annual reports.
The mean and median monetary compensation (salary and bonus) is around GBP 144,000
and GBP 149,000 (panel A of Table I). The mean capital gearing (deﬁned as long term-debt
on total assets) equals 32.65%. Interest coverage (EBIT on interest charges) amounts to 12.4.
Yearly ownership data both for existing and new shareholders for each year of the sample
period was also collected from the Directors’ Report and the Notes in the annual reports21.
Non-beneﬁcial share stakes held by the directors on behalf of their families or charitable trusts
were added to the directors’ beneﬁcial holdings. Although directors do not obtain cash ﬂow
beneﬁts from these non-beneﬁcial stakes, they usually exercise the voting rights. The status
18For the eﬀect of the recommendations in the Cadbury corporate governance code of conduct on perfor-
mance and turnover, see Dahya et al. (2002). The London Stock Exchange imposed the recommendation on all
listed companies as of end of 1993. The Greenbury code of conduct of 1995 consists of a set of recommendations
related to the remuneration of top managers.
19We also work with alternative subsamples of poorly performing ﬁrms which are close to ﬁnancial distress
(interest coverage below 2). We also check the robustness of results using alternative measures of poor
performance: earnings losses combined with dividend cuts and omissions, and abnormal returns of less than
minus 50% combined with earnings losses and dividends cuts and omissions.
20We are grateful to Martin Conyon and Graham Sadler for providing us with post-Greenbury data.
21Legal disclosure of ownership applies to all the directors’ holdings greater than 0.1% as well as to other
shareholders’ stakes of 5% and more and of 3% and above (from 1990 when the statutory disclosure threshold
was reduced). For equity stakes in Nominees accounts, the identity of the shareholders was found by contacting
the listed ﬁrms directly. In 97% of these cases, the shareholders of Nominees accounts were institutional
investors.
15of the directors (executive/non-executive) and the dates of CEOs joining and leaving the
board were also obtained from the annual reports. The mean CEO share stake of a randomly
selected pre-Cadbury sample was 2.98%.
Panel B of Table I gives a more detailed account of CEO compensation in the post-
Greenbury period22. Base salary in 1997 amounts to an average of GBP 271,000 (with
a median of GBP 240,000). The bonus including other cash compensation averages GBP
143,000 (panel B of Table I). As option grants and long term incentive plans grants average
GBP 178,000 (with a median of zero), the average total CEO remuneration is GBP 591,000
(with a mean of 414,000). The leverage ratio (debt on total assets) is about 47% and the
interest coverage averages 14.5. Panel B of Table I also shows that the average CEO holds
2.13% of the shares outstanding (with a median 0.05%). In addition, the average CEO has
the right to obtain an additional average equity stake of 0.2% (median of 0.06%) by exercising
options or long term incentive plans (LTIPs). The percentage of equity that those claims are
translated into is calculated by multiplying the options (and of LTIP shares) as a percentage
of all shares outstanding with their deltas. The delta reﬂe c t st h ec h a n g ei nt h ev a l u eo fa n
option resulting from a change in the price of the underlying asset. The delta is close to one
for deep-in-the money options and close to zero for deep-out-of —the money options23.
[Insert Table I about here]
The median age of a CEO in a randomly selected ﬁrm (pre-Greenbury sample) is 52 years
(with a mean of 52.6) and a median tenure equals 4 years (the mean equals 5.2)24.E v e r y
third CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board of directors. The median board
consists of 9 directors, 61.5% of whom are non-executive directors. In approximately 26% of
the pre-Greenbury sample, CEO compensation is determined by a remuneration committee.
The presence of such committees (postulated by the report) can alter compensation policies
and eliminate the situation when the remuneration decision is largely inﬂuenced by CEOs
themselves (Conyon (1994), Conyon et al. (1995)). The fraction of companies having such a
c o m m i t t e ei sm o r et h a n9 5 %i n1997-98.
As is typical for Anglo-American ﬁrms, ownership concentration is relatively low. The
median Herﬁdahl-5 index equals only 0.028 (with a mean of 0.057). The median of the
combined shareholdings of all executive directors (excluding CEO) amounts to less than 1%,
with an average of slightly below 8%. Stakes of non-executives are lower and do not exceed
4%, on average. The most important class of blockholders consists of ﬁnancial institutions:
they hold a (cumulative) median stake of 13% (a mean of 16.6%). Finally, other outsiders —
individuals, families and industrial ﬁrms — control on average 8.2% of equity.
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model and are corrected for thin trad-
ing25. We also use alternative performance measures like the percentage dividend changes
22It should be noted that the data in panels A and B of Table 1 are not directly comparable for two
reasons: (i) in section 6.1 was pointed out that the pre-Greenbury sample is a random sample whereas the
post-Greenbury sample includes the largest ﬁrms only and (ii) the time periods are diﬀerent; they are 7 years
apart (1990 vs 1997.
23For a thorough description of the methodology: see Conyon and Murphy (2000). Conyon and Sadler
(2001).
24Tables with ownership concentration and director characteristics are available upon request.
25Both a Dimson (1979)-correction for non-synchronous trading and a Vasicek (1973)-Bayesian updating
are applied.
16(between years t − 2 and t − 1, and between t − 1 and t, respectively), which are collected
from Datastream, and employ return on assets (EBIT over book value of total assets) as
accounting-based performance indicators. In order to control for (potential) size eﬀects, we
introduce the logarithm of total assets (in £ thousands) at the end of a given year. Finally,
we measure risk by the annual volatility of stock returns, which is gathered from the Lon-
don Share Price Database. The median and mean values amount to 34.39% and 37.43%,
respectively.
5.3 Methodology
Our ﬁrst sample consists of a data panel, but implementation of panel data econometrics like
GMM-in-systems to investigate the relation between managerial remuneration and leverage
induces biases as this relation is disturbed by the occasional departure of top management.
Therefore, sample selection models are applied to analyze jointly the relations between exec-
utive compensation schemes and leverage, and between CEO turnover (c.q. the nomination
of a new CEO) and its determinants. The model, often referred to as a type-2 Tobit model,
is speciﬁed as follows:
½
y∗
1 it = X0
1 itβ1 + ε1 it
y∗
2 it = X0




1 it > 0
0 if y∗




2 it if y∗
2 it > 0
0 if y∗
2 it ≤ 0
where {ε1 it,ε 2 it} are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0, variances σ2
1
and σ2
2 , covariance σ12 (Amemiya (1984)). y-variables are quantities of interest while X-
variables correspond to the explanatory variables. Finally, β1 and β2 are vectors of the model
coeﬃcients. It is assumed that only the sign of y∗
1 it is observed and that y∗
2 it is observed
only when y∗
1 it > 0. Moreover, it is assumed that X1i are observed for all i,b u tX2i need
not be observed for i such that y∗
1 it ≤ 0. Finally the two sets of explanatory variables, i.e.
X1 it,a n dX2 it, are not disjoint (they can diﬀer, however).
In a standard setting, error terms are assumed to be i.i.d. drawings from a bivariate
normal distribution. In our models, i corresponds to a ﬁrm and t to a year. We relax the
assumption of independence of ε’s across i and allow clustering of observations corresponding
to a given ﬁrm, i.e. we assume error terms to be i.i.d. across ﬁrms, but not necessarily for
diﬀerent observations within the same ﬁrm. All the reported standard errors of estimates
are adjusted for clustering (StataCorp (2001)). This procedure enhances robustness of our
ﬁndings and allows us to take the panel data structure of our sample explicitly into account.
To estimate the type-2 Tobit models, we employ a two-step procedure suggested by Heckman
(1979), which yields consistent parameter estimates.
Equation (1a) is the selection equation, while equation (1b) is referred to as a regression
equation. The selection equation explains CEO replacement, i.e. y1 it =1 , corresponds
to those ﬁrm-years when the CEO kept his position. The regression equation explains the
17compensation of such CEOs in the subsequent year. As the notion of compensation sensitivity
is not meaningful for new CEOs, we restrict the remuneration analysis to CEOs with a tenure
of more than one year. Estimating the parameters of the regression equation (1b) on the basis
of the non-turnover sample only, would not be a valid alternative to the proposed method
because the OLS estimator of β2 is biased when the selection of the regression sample is
endogenous (i.e., σ12 6=0 ). Instead, our sample selection model deals with the endogeneity
of selection, and therefore renders reliable parameter estimates for the regression equation
(Greene (2000)).
6 Some empirical results on remuneration contracts, leverage
and ﬁnancial distress
Table II shows the sample selection models explaining the sensitivity of top management
remuneration to leverage. We examine this sensitivity for the total pre-Greenbury sample
as well as for the subsamples consisting of (i) well performing ﬁrms, (ii) poorly performing
ﬁrms and (iii) poorly performing ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress. Poor performance is deﬁned as
ﬁrms in the lowest abnormal return quintile. Financial distress is deﬁned here as companies
with an interest coverage below two because investment grade companies “typically have
coverage ratios exceeding two times interest expense” (Copeland et al., 1995, p.178). The
results of Panel A consist of the regression equations which capture CEO turnover or, in
other words, the signing of a contract with a new CEO. Panel B excludes the structural
break in remuneration (due to the new contracts) and examines the remuneration sensitivity
to leverage for ongoing contracts.
[insert Table II about here]
The results of Panel A of Table II indicate that high leverage is not signiﬁcantly related
to managerial disciplining (the removal of the CEO) in the average and well performing
ﬁrms. However, in line with earlier research (e.g. Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002)), we
ﬁnd that high leverage leads to CEO departures especially the case for poorly performing and
ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms. Panel A of Table II also discloses that CEO turnover is negatively
related to poor share price and accounting performance. The composition of the board
of directors also has a signiﬁcant impact on CEO removal: large boards lead to increased
CEO turnover in the well performing ﬁrms. A high fraction of non-executive directors and
separation of the functions of CEO and chairman facilitates the removal of the CEO both
in well and poorly performing ﬁrms (speciﬁcations 1- 4 ) . T h e s er e s u l t sa r ei nl i n ew i t ht h e
traditional corporate governance predictions stating that a high fraction of non-executive
directors enhances the board’s independence and fosters better monitoring. Furthermore, the
fact that the CEO does not dominate the board as a chairman also reduces potential conﬂicts
of interest and reduces agency conﬂicts. Whereas corporate size and risk are not related to
CEO turnover, ownership concentration is correlated to turnover. We ﬁnd evidence of insider
entrenchment (as documented by e.g. Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001)): when insiders
control large share blocks, the removal of top management is less frequent (speciﬁcations 1-3).
The insigniﬁcant interaction terms with accounting returns indicate that insiders with large
18ownership stakes are able to successfully ward oﬀ any attempts to replace the CEO regardless
of performance (speciﬁcations 1 and 2). Furthermore, there is some evidence that the presence
of outside blockholders leads to increased managerial turnover in poorly performing samples
(speciﬁcation 3).
The regression equation (Panel B of Table II) shows that industry-adjusted remuneration
is not correlated to leverage for the total sample. However, we do ﬁnd a positive relation
between total monetary remuneration and (lagged) leverage for poorly performing ﬁrms in
ﬁnancial distress26. The lack of detailed disclosure of remuneration contracts in the pre-
Greenbury period does not allow us to test the relation between debt and remuneration in
detail. If there is a positive relation between debt and base salary which dominates a negative
relation between debt and bonus, the results are in line with the case in which remuneration
is senior to debt. Vice versa, if that positive relation in Table II is the result of the fact that
a positive debt-bonus relation dominates a negative debt-salary relation, the results support
the case in which remuneration is junior to debt claims. The post-Greenbury period allows
us to disaggregate the positive relation between debt and total monetary remuneration (see
below).
With regard to the control variables, we ﬁnd that remuneration increases with good
share price performance and industry-adjusted accounting performance (speciﬁcations 1-4
in panel B of Table II). There is no signiﬁcant relation between board characteristics and
the CEO’s monetary remuneration with the exception of board size. We also ﬁnd that, in
line with the UK remuneration literature (amongst others; Conyon and Murphy (2000)),
CEOs of larger ﬁrms enjoy signiﬁcantly higher industry-adjusted cash compensation. Top
management usually tries to justify — rightly so or not — size-related compensation by the
fact that to manage larger ﬁrms, more managerial skills are needed which may be in short
supply. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), and Jin (2002) argue that in an agency framework,
managerial risk aversion implies that ﬁrm risk moderates performance sensitivity of executive
compensation. For the whole sample and the sample of well performing ﬁrms (speciﬁcations
1-2), we ﬁnd some evidence of a risk-remuneration relation, but this is not corroborated for
the poor performance samples (speciﬁcation 3-4).
The remuneration equation (panel B of table II) shows that when insiders hold large
share stakes, the CEO’s monetary remuneration is lower. It may be that CEOs deriving
substantial wealth from their equity investment in their corporation, care less about their
monetary income. Still, when the ﬁrm’s stock performance (abnormal return) is low and
the wealth of a CEO with a large ownership stake therefore decreases, the CEO is paid a
relatively higher level of cash compensation (the interaction term in speciﬁcation 1 of panel
B). This implies that CEOs receive a higher monetary compensation in the wake of poor
stock performance provided that they have strong voting power. It seems that managerial
entrenchment not only eliminates the disciplining of poorly performing management but also
introduces a pernicious remuneration incentive scheme. Speciﬁcations 3 and 4 show that
insider control leads to higher monetary remuneration. This ﬁnding is consistent with a
recently proposed “managerial power” approach to executive compensation (Bebchuk and
Fried, 2003). In well performing companies (speciﬁcation 2), insider ownership increases
remuneration but only when stock prices rise. When outside shareholders hold large stakes,
26Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993), Dial and Murphy (1995), and more extensively Murphy (1999) provide
empirical evidence documenting that signiﬁcant increases in junior bonuses arise in companies with high
leverage.
19the monetary compensation of the CEO is lower.
[Insert Table III about here]
As we do not dispose of a data panel for the post-Greenbury period, we investigate the
relation between leverage and the detail of remuneration (base salary in panel A of Table III),
bonus in panel B, and options and long term incentive grants in panel C) by testing diﬀerences
in means for the samples of poorly performing, and of poorly performing and ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms by leverage quartile. While the ﬁrst 3 panels are based on data from the post-
Greenbury period, we use pre-Greenbury data (from Table II) in panel D. The predictions of
the theoretical model state that (1) when compensation is senior to debt in case of ﬁnancial
distress, higher leverage reduces the performance bonus, but increases the basic salary, and
(2) for compensation junior to debt in case of ﬁnancial distress, higher leverage increases the
bonus and decreases the base salary. While the left hand side of panels A-C shows little
relation between the diﬀerences in means of the base salary for diﬀerent subsamples of poorly
performing ﬁrms with similar leverage, more interesting ﬁndings are presented for poorly
performing ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress (the right hand side). In line with prediction (1), we
ﬁnd that the base salary in the highest leverage sample is signiﬁcantly higher than in the
quartiles with lower leverage (panel A) but that the bonus in the lowest leverage quartile
is signiﬁcantly higher than that in quartiles 3 and 1. These results (and prediction (1)) are
in line with a regime in which remuneration-related claims are more senior to debt related
claims. This situation does not take place in case of liquidation receivership) but is the case
when a ﬁrm enters the administration procedure or when management succeeds in making
their claims de facto senior as described in Appendix B (transfer of undertakings protection
of employees, contract renewal in the wake of insolvency, proﬁt transfer to subsidiaries etc.).
It is not surprising that we ﬁnd results in line with prediction (1) for the right hand side of
panels A and B as we focus there on ﬁrms for which the seniority structure of claims is likely
t ob e c o m eam a j o ri s s u ea si n s o l v e n c yi sn e a r . P a n e lCs h o w sn od i ﬀerence in option and
LTIP values by leverage quartiles. Finally, the results of the pre-Greenbury data in panel D
conﬁr mt h o s eo fT a b l eI I :t h et o t a lc a s hc o m p e n s a t i o ni sh i g h e ri nd i s t r e s s e dﬁrms with high
leverage, but the diﬀerence in means is weakly statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This
marginal signiﬁcance is not surprising as the relation between leverage, and - respectively -
base salary and bonus is inverse (as shown in panels A and B).
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀect of debt ﬁnancing on managerial remuneration contracts assum-
ing that the ﬁnancing decision is taken at a point in time preceding the contract negotiation.
While in previous theoretical research, the seniority of debt with regard to remuneration con-
tracts in case of insolvency is a standard assumption, this paper contributes to the literature
by questioning this issue. This paper documents that the relative seniority depends on the
choice of bankruptcy procedures in case of insolvency and that there are several ways by
which management can ensure its monetary compensation is de facto senior to debt even
when insolvency is likely. Furthermore, we theoretically show that the eﬀect of leverage on
20managerial compensation and eﬀort depends on the relative seniority of compensation versus
debt.
We show that changing the capital structure of the ﬁrm changes the incentive for a
shareholder-principal to "give incentives" to the management ("contract substitution"e ﬀect).
In particular, our model predicts that pay-for-performance sensitivity is negatively related
with leverage (while the base salary increases with leverage) if managerial compensation has
priority over the debt claims. The intuition of this result is that, whenever risky debt is
issued, the principal does not completely internalize the beneﬁts of a higher incentive bonus
(with respect to the bonus he would propose in a ﬁrm with 100 % equity ﬁnancing) because
these beneﬁts are shared with the debtholders. This implies that in highly levered ﬁrms,
we do expect a much weaker pay-for-performance relation and hence lower bonuses, than
in low leverage ﬁrms. In contrast, when managerial remuneration is junior to debt claims,
leverage has a direct incentive eﬀect on the managerial eﬀort, and is then complementary to
an increase in the junior power-incentives, and to a reduction of the base salary. The reason
is that an increase in senior debt ﬁnancing triggers higher managerial eﬀort, in turn requiring
a higher performance-related managerial compensation in good states of the world.
Moreover, we argue that (risky) debt ﬁnancing is more likely to be optimal when it is
senior to the compensation claims. The intuition of this result is similar to Innes (1990) and
Hart and Moore (1995) who claim that debt ﬁnancing is a good instrument to enforce high
eﬀort by a residual claimant entrepreneur subject to limited liability.
We test the theoretical predictions using of two samples of UK data, one from the pre-
Greenbury period (prior to 1996) and one post-Greenbury sample. In the ﬁrst period, limited
disclosure does not allow us to distinguish between the various components of managerial
remuneration, but we observe a positive relation between leverage and total monetary re-
muneration. In the post-Greenbury sample, however, we dissect this relation into a positive
relation between leverage and base salary and a negative one between leverage and perfor-
mance bonus. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the theoretical predictions in a world where managerial
compensation is (de facto) senior to debt claims. We have documented that both bankruptcy
regulation (c.q. administration or Chapter 11) and managers’ ability to (re)write contracts
making their pay senior to debt even in the wake of poor performance, apply to this case.
8 Appendix A (proofs)
Result A: If p(a) is weakly increasing and weakly concave, then it satisﬁes (MLRP) and
(CFDC).
Proof. Order the actions in [0,e] according to their reservation price CFB(e),h i g h e r
eﬀort requiring higher cost: for any couple e0,e∈ [0,e], let e>e 0 ⇔ CFB(e) >C FB(e0).B y
deﬁnition (see Grossman and Hart (1983)) such a cost is given by the minimum payment P
has to guarantee to make A choosing the eﬀort e when the eﬀort choice is observable (ﬁrst
best):
CFB(e)=u−1(c(e)+U)
Restate (MLRP) for our two-states framework: ∀e,e0 ∈ Λ if CFB(e0) ≤ CFB(e) then
pi(e0)
pi(e) is non increasing in the state i (weakly decreasing; the states i have been ordered
21for increasing payoﬀs qi). In a simple 2-states framework this means that for any couple








p(e0) that is veriﬁed for p(e)
(weakly) increasing in e.
(CDFC) requires that the cumulative distribution function is convex in e. With only
two-states, calling F(0;e)=P r ( qi = q0;e)=1− p(e) and F(0;λe +( 1− λ)e0)=1− p(λe +
(1 − λ)e0), while λF(0;e)+( 1− λ)F(0;e0)=1− λp(e) − (1 − λ)p(e0).T h e n ( C D F C ) ⇐⇒
F(0;λe+(1−λ)e0) ≤ λF(0;e)+(1−λ)F(0;e0) ⇐⇒ λp(e)+(1−λ)p(e0) ≤ p(λe+(1−λ)e0)
that is guaranteed by (weak) concavity of p(e). Q.E.D
P r o o fo fL e m m a1: (i) Order the set [0,e] in the sense that the higher e has a higher
CFB(e).W ea s s u m eU(0) = 0. Grossman and Hart (1983) (see their Proposition 11)p r o v e
that in a two-outcomes moral hazard problem the participation constraint is binding for all
e: hence, putting together (IR) and (1):
w0 = u−1
µ































































if we require U + c(e) −
c0(e)
p0(e)p(e) > 0 ⇒ U>
c0(e)
p0(e)p(e) − c(e) we have that the agent will
always receive a strictly positive payment in state q0. All lower actions require a base salary
(weakly) higher than U + c(e) −
c0(e)
p0(e)p(e),s i n c ew0 is decreasing in e.
To induce e =0a performance-independent salary is required (P provides full insurance






. This is the highest base
salary (and the lowest w1)t h ea g e n tc a nr e c e i v e :i m p o s i n gq0 − wfi > 0 guarantees that the
resources created by the ﬁrm in state 0 are enough to fully insure the agent.
Finally, since w1 weakly increases in e, the maximum payment the agent receives in state





p0(e) (1 − p(e))
´
:l e t t i n gq1 − wmax
1 > 0 guarantees
that the principal can always aﬀord to implement e.
(ii) Consider again (1):
c0(e)
p0(e) is increasing in e by Assumptions 1-2. Hence, the diﬀerence
u(w1) − u(w0) required to implement any given e is increasing in e.
Given the concavity of u, for any w1 − w0, u(w1) − u(w0) is higher the lower is w0.
For P it is always convenient to reduce w0 at the minimum level and then ﬁx w1 such that
u(w1) − u(w0)=
c0(e)
p0(e). Formally, if we denote with b = w1 − w0 the performance bonus,
from(1)w eh a v e : u(w0 + b(w0)) − u(w0)=
c0(e)
p0(e) = k(e) so that, keeping e constant and










− 1 > 0
22by strict concavity of u(w). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: The result q0 − w0(e0) ≤ q1 − w1(e0) derives directly from
Corollary 2, noticing that, if e =0is optimal for P, then w0 = w1 = wfi while, for any e>0,
w1(e) >w 0(e) by Lemma 1. From Assumption 4, the f.o.c. (3) is necessary and suﬃcient to





= p0w1 + p
∂w1
∂e
− p0w0 +( 1− p)
∂w0
∂e





























where for brevity p = p(e), h(u)=w1, h(u)=w0 denoting with h = u−1 and u ≡ U +c(e)+
c0(e)
p0(e) (1 − p(e)),a n du ≡ U + c(e) −
c0(e)
p0(e)p(e). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: For levels of debt D ≤ q0−w0(e0) the solution of (4) coincides
with the solution of (2) since Ben(e;D)=Ben(e;0).F o r D>q 0 − w0(e0) the objective
function for the principal changes: shareholders get zero in state q0. The objective for P
when D ∈ [q0 − w0(e0),q 1 − w1(e0)[ becomes:
p(e)(q1 − w1(e) − D)
that, at e = e0 values p(e0)(q1 − w1(e0)− D).S i n c eb o t hp(e) and w1(e) are continuous and
diﬀerentiable in e,c h e c k
∂p(e0)(q1 − w1(e0) − D)
∂e
= p0(e)(q1 − w1(e0) − D) − p(e0)
dw1(e0)
de (7)















and substituting into (7):
∂p(e0)(q1 − w1(e0) − D)
∂e





which is negative for D>q 0 since, by Lemma 1,
dw0(e0)
de < 0. Then, the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fP
at e = e0 is decreasing, that ensures that the new solution eD <e 0.
For D>q 1 − w1(e0) the principal gets an expected payoﬀ of zero inducing eﬀort e0.H e
can improve upon it inducing an eﬀort eD s.t. q1 − w1(eD) >D>q 1 − w1(e0). Hence a
contract with w1(eD) <w 1(e0) is preferred by P. But this, by Lemma 1,i m p l i e seD <e 0.
Q.E.D.




0 >q 0 −D,b u tD<min{q0,q 1 −w0
1}. Denote by e0 the optimal eﬀort chosen by the agent
who signs this contract when D =0 .I fD>q 0 − w0
0 the agent knows that if q0 realizes, he
will get only q0 − D since the principal is protected by limited liability. His (IC) constraint
becomes
u(w0





p0(e) is increasing in e (Lemma 1), the agent is pushed to optimally choose a higher
eﬀort e∗ >e 0 ("incentive eﬀect"). However, at e∗ his participation constraint is not satisﬁed
with the payment w0
1 :
p(e∗)u(w0
1)+( 1− p(e∗))u(q0 − D) − c(e∗) <p (e∗)u(w∗
1)+( 1− p(e∗))u(q0 − D) − c(e∗)=U
since by Lemma 1 (ii),h i g h e re ﬀorts require higher payments in state q1,s ow∗
1 >w 0
1.T h e
agent would then refuse the contract (w0
0,w0
1).
By Lemma 1 (ii), we can order the set of eﬀorts in a simple way: if e<e 0 ⇒ w0(e) >w 0(e0)
and w1(e) <w 1(e0): hence, all eﬀorts which require a w0 >q 0−D are not feasible with senior
debt D. The result eD ≥ e0 is then immediate.
Since the marginal beneﬁto fa n ye for the principal reduces to p0(e)(q1−D) <p 0(e)(q1−q0)
the principal will optimally choose to implement the lower feasible action: so, by Lemma 1
(ii) P will propose (q0 − D,wD
1 ) s.t. both (IC) and (IR) are satisﬁed:
u(wD




1 )+( 1− p(eD))u(q0 − D) − c(eD)=U
If D>min{q0,q 1 − w0
1} t h ea g e n tk n o w st h a ta tm o s th ew i l lg e tz e r oi ns t a t eq0 : in
fact q1 − w1 >q 0 − w0 for all e (Corollary 2): even if the principal would like to reward
him with lower power-incentives, she has no resources to do this in q0.T h u s ,o n l ye = e can
be implemented since any lower eﬀort requires a positive payment in state q0. Hence, either
w1(e)+D<q 1 so the principal is constrained to oﬀer the maximum power-incentive contract
(0,w 1(e)) or there is simply no contract satisfying both (IR) and (IC).
Q.E.D.
9 Appendix B
In case a UK ﬁrm is insolvent, it may enter either a receivership or administration. In the UK,
the former procedure is creditor-oriented and in most cases leads to full or partial liquidation
of the ﬁrm’s assets. The latter procedure is debtor-oriented, resembles the US Chapter 11-
procedure and formalizes a workout with the aim of corporate survival (Franks and Torous
(2002) and Franks and Nyborg (1996))27.W h e naﬁrm is in receivership (and is bankrupt),
27This concise description of seniority of remuneration and leverage in the UK bankruptcy process is based
on schedule 6 of the Insolvency Act (1986) and has beneﬁted from discussions with Mr. Ralph Paterson (who
frequently acts as a receiver for a major audit ﬁrm), to Mr. Nigel Boobier (who is a bankruptcy lawyer for
Osborne & Clark) and to Prof. Julian Franks (London Business School).
24the following claims have preferential status: payroll taxes, VAT (from the period before
the receivership) and the arrears in wages (including accrued holiday pay and occupational
pension fund contributions). It should be noted that the preferential status of the arrears in
wages is limited to the gross amount of GBP 800 per employee (excluding directors). This
modest amount was never adjusted — not even for inﬂation - since the 1986 Company Act.
All other unpaid remuneration is not preferential and unsecured and hence will be paid out
on a pro -rata basis like all other unsecured creditors. Thus, under a liquidation code, the
remuneration claims based on salary and bonuses in arrears are junior with regard to all
secured debt and is put at the same seniority level of all other unsecured claims.
When a ﬁrm enters receivership, a receiver is appointed by the party holding a ﬂoating
charge debenture. Essentially, a debenture is a claim over speciﬁc assets and, in case of cor-
porate default, crystallizes into a ﬁxed or ﬂoating charge. The former charge applies directly
t oas p e c i ﬁc asset like a building or vital machinery. The latter applies to the category of
‘ﬂoating assets’ like e.g. inventory. The holder of a debenture is usually a bank, an asset
ﬁnancier, a private individual or a major supplier who advanced money against inventory or
against plant, property or equipment (ppe) or who extended the credit period. The receiver
(appointed by the holder of the ﬂoating charge) can liquidate the assets of the ﬂoating charge
(e.g. the inventory) and the proceeds of the sale (including the potential surplus), net of
costs, will go to the preferential creditors (c.q. debenture holder with ﬂoating charge)28.T h e
remainder of the assets will be sold by a liquidator on behalf of the unsecured claimholders.
In this category belong the arrears in remuneration of managers. There are many cases in
which top management can still claim remuneration (including bonuses) which is in arrears.
First, instead of selling the ﬂoating charge assets, the receiver can continue the business if
the proceeds of continuation are expected to exceed those of a liquidation. If this were the
c a s e ,h ec a nt a k et h eb u s i n e s so u to ft h ec o r p o r a t es h e l la n d ,i fh er e t a i n st h em a n a g e m e n t ,
the managerial remuneration contracts (and the arrears remuneration and bonuses) may re-
main valid. This is called the ‘Transfer of undertakings protection of employment’ regulation
(TUPE). Second, receiver can sell one line of business, to pay the secured creditors oﬀ.A t
that point, the receiver ceases to act (he only works on behalf of the holders of the ﬂoating
charge) and the company is again in the hands of the directors whose remuneration con-
tracts remain valid. Third, an alternative to the creditor-oriented receivership process is the
debtor-oriented ‘administration’ procedure. The court supervises a formal workout (ﬁnancial
and asset reorganization) aiming at the survival of the restructured ﬁrm. If the incumbent
management is essential for the ﬁrm and is maintained after the implementation of the reor-
ganization plan, the employment contracts and hence the claims of past remuneration may
remain valid. The recent changes in bankruptcy legislation29 are moving the UK procedures
closer to a US-style ‘debtor-in-possession’ concept30. Fourth, as documented in section 1,
top management is frequently able to safeguard bonuses (even if ‘performance’-related) by
28If is possible that the party holding a ﬁxed charge will also appoint a receiver whose only aim is to sell
secured ﬁxed assets (from plant, property and equipment).
29See the Enterprise Act (2002), applicable since September 2003. The changes in administration are in the
ﬁrst place geared towards the survival of the company and, failing that, towards the survival of the business.
If these two objectives cannot be realised, the charged assets will be disposed oﬀ.
30For a discussion of the US bankruptcy procedures and a comparison with the UK and Germany: see
Franks and Torous (2002). The recent changes in bankruptcy legislation (of September 2003) are more geared
towards the survival of the company (rather than the business) moving the UK procedures closer to the
‘debtor-in-possession’ concept of US Chapter 11.
25timing the payment well or by signing new contracts with substantial severance payments
even when the ﬁrm is very close to insolvency.
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ownership stakes and other equity related holdings are shown. The pre-Greenbury sample consists of a random sample of firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange and covers the years 1988-93. The post-Greenbury sample consists of the 510 largest  UK 
firms and covers the years for 1997-98.  
 
    Mean   Median  Std. deviation 
Panel A: pre-Greenbury sample (250 firms, 1453 observations) 
  CEO compensation and ownership 
Salary and Bonus (GBP 000)  144  149  46.57 
CEO stake (%)  2.98  0.00  8.10 
  Leverage 
Capital gearing  32.65  29.72  24.78 
Interest coverage   12.38  9.43  8.84 
 
Panel B : Post-Greenbury sample (510 firms and observations) 
  CEO compensation (GBP 000) 
Salary   271  240  62.70 
Bonus 118  69  47.36 
Other cash  25  14  26.91 
Total cash  414  340  74.11 
Option grants  96  0  39.84 
Long term incentive plan grants   82  0  33.79 
Total pay  591  414  110.15 
  Leverage (%) 
Capital gearing  47.32  40.16  20.78 
Interest coverage   14.52  13.72  7.83 
  CEO ownership 
Share stake (%)  2.13  0.05  1.97 
Option holdings (% of equity x option delta)  0.18  0.06  0.14 
Long term incentive holdings (% x delta)  0.02  0.00  0.01 
Total equity related holdings (%)  2.33  0.25  1.21 Table II. Sample selection models: CEO replacement and industry-adjusted monetary compensation. 
The table presents the estimates of the sample selection models for top executive replacement (selection equation of Panel A) 
and CEO industry-adjusted compensation (regression equation of Panel B). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering of 
observations on each firm. The dependent binary variable of Panel A equals one for CEOs that were not replaced in a given year 
and zero otherwise. Capital gearing is expressed in percentage terms and is lagged by one year. The industry-adjusted ROA is 
defined as industry-year median adjusted return on equity (in percentage terms) lagged by one year. Likewise, abnormal stock 
return is lagged one year. Board size is defined as a natural logarithm of the total number of directors. Fraction of outside 
directors is expressed as a percentage of outsiders on the board. The last of the board characteristics is a dummy variable that 
equals one for CEOs serving at the same time the function of board chairmen. Firm size is proxied by a natural logarithm of the 
total book value of assets. Company risk is measured as an annual volatility of stock returns. The blockholding variables consist 
of insider stakes (the amalgamation of the shareholdings of the CEO, executive and non-executive directors). The outsider 
blockholdings are the amalgamation of the stakes held by financial institutions, families and individuals, the government and 
corporations, respectively, provided the individual stakes are 5% or above. In the regression equations (Panel B) the dependent 
variable is an industry-adjusted CEO cash compensation in the subsequent year. The explanatory variables are here time-varying 
regressors are lagged one year less compared to those from Panel A. The remuneration committee presence is a dummy variable 
that equals one for firm-years, when remuneration committee was in place. 
***, 
**, 
* stand for statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 




performing firms  
(4) Poorly 
performing firms in 
financial distress  
Panel A: Selection equations  Dependent variable equals 0 if the CEO is replaced and 1 otherwise. 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Intercept 3.7292
*** 0.000  0.8363
* 0.094  7.9987
*** 0.006 10.3180
** 0.012 
  Leverage   
Capital gearing  -0.0005  0.626  0.00032  0.722  -0.0062  0.121  -0.0025
* 0.076 
Capital gearing. * insider stake  -0.0013  0.811  0.00037  0.721  0.0044  0.725  ---   
Capital gearing* outsider stake  0.0008  0.526  0.00040  0.351  0.0048  0.361  ---   
  Performance indicators 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1 0.0122
* 0.052 0.0241 0.351  0.0211
** 0.047 0.0452
** 0.048 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1 0.0053
** 0.034  0.0073 0.251 0.0039
* 0.062 0.0083
** 0.050 
  Board composition 
Board size   -0.9892
*** 0.000 -0.8311
** 0.021  -0.6110 0.219 -0.2316  0.516 
Fraction of non-executive directors  -0.0089
** 0.044 -0.0121
* 0.068 -0.0201 0.078 -0.0161 0.155 
CEO is also the chairman  0.4261
*** 0.005 0.5161
*** 0.001  0.2810
* 0.077 0.5191
* 0.053 
  Firm size, and risk 
Firm size  0.0617  0.142  0.0373
* 0.089 0.0351 0.361 0.0311 0.365 
Risk -0.0072  0.461  -0.0015  0.372  0.0079  0.360  -0.0072  0.425 
  Ownership concentration 
Insiders’ blockholdings  0.0132
** 0.041 0.0627
* 0.077 0.0566
** 0.041  0.0788  0.200 
Accounting perform. * insider stake  -0.0001  0.648  0.0215  0.256  ---    ---   
Stock Price perform. * insider  stake  -0.0003  0.220  0.0259
** 0.050  ---    ---   
Outside block holdings  -0.0052  0.291  -0.0025  0.566  -0.0351
* 0.082 -0.0673  0.182 
Account. perform. * outsider stake  -0.00002  0.811  0.0067  0.368  ---    ---   
Stock Price perf. * outsider stake  0.00001  0.942  0.0028  0.210  ---    ---   
  Year and industry control variables 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald χ
2  χ
2(31) = 105.63  χ
2(31) = 79.22  χ
2(27) = 47.25  χ
2(25) = 29.88 
P-value for χ
2  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  
Table 2 - continued. 




performing firms  
(4) Poorly 
performing firms 
in financial distress 
Panel B: Regression equations  Dependent variable is the industry-adjusted CEO cash remuneration 
  Estimate p-value  Estimate  p-
value 






Leverage   0.0010 0.356  0.0156  0.176  0.0327  0.126  0.0236
** 0.046 
  Performance indicators 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1 0.0032




Abnormal stock returns in year t-1 0.0018
*** 0.001  0.0145
*** 0.001  0.0316
* 0.062 0.0036 0.256 
  Board composition 
Board size   0.1892
** 0.015 0.0527
* 0.062 0.0526  0.256  0.0354  0.873 
Fraction of non-executive directors  0.0019  0.271  0.0025  0.738  0.0131  0.346  0.0132  0.236 
CEO is the board chairman  0.0302  0.525  0.0389  0.121  0.0556  0.512  0.0265  0.379 
Remuneration committee presence  -0.0192  0.659  0.0168  0.572  0.0483  0.361  -0.0215  0.251 
  Firm size, leverage, and risk 







** 0.032  0.0085  0.579  0.0423  0.289 
  Ownership concentration 
Insiders’ blockholdings  -0.0045
*** 0.007  0.0084 0.157 0.0077
* 0.075 0.0115
* 0.083 
Accounting perform. * insider stakes  0.0001  0.329  0.0035  0.236  ---    ---   
Stock Price perform. * insider stakes  -0.0001
** 0.024 0.0028
** 0.044  ---    ---   
Outside block holdings  -0.0031
** 0.046 -0.0073  0.258  -0.0067
* 0.093  -0.0055  0.112 
Account. perform. * outsider stakes  -0.00004  0.506  -0.0001  0.258  ---    ---   
Stock Price perf. * outsider stakes  0.00001  0.942  0.0004
* 0.062  ---    ---   
  Year control variables 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald χ
2  χ
2(19) = 467.12  χ
2(19) = 165.63  χ
2(15) = 44.64  χ
2(15) = 34.61 
P-value for χ
2  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01 
Panel C: Model statistics and tests        
Total no. of observations  847  677  208  114 
No. of censored observations  101  74  69  54 
No. of uncensored observations  746  603  139  60 
Log-likelihood -623.95  -257.99  -94.33  -63.01 
Wald χ
2 (joint signific. of equations)  χ
2(50) = 801.73  χ
2(50) = 256.12  χ
2(42) = 68.74  χ
2(42) = 55.23 
P-value for χ
2  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01 
Estimate of ρ -0.549  -0.166  -0.206  -0.298 
Wald χ




2(1) = 8.030  χ
2(1) = 7.371  χ
2(1) = 6.382  χ
2(1) = 5.909 
P-value for χ
2  <0.01 <0.01  <0.01  <0.01 
 Table III: The relation between leverage and remuneration 
The sample of poorly performing firms consist of the firms within the lowest quintile of abnormal returns. Poorly performing companies in financial distress 
are within that lowest quintile of performance but also have interest coverage below 2. Panels A-C use data of the post-Greenbury period (1997) whereas 
panel D is based on pre-Greenbury data (1988-1993). 
***, 
**, 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Poorly performing companies  Poorly performing companies in financial distress 
  









STD Difference in means (t-test)
 
Quartile 1 (highest)  41  241  92.7  Q1 vs Q2  0.703    20  231  84.7  Q1 vs Q2  0.255   
Quartile 2  41  227  87.4  Q1 vs Q3  1.007    20  224  88.5  Q1 vs Q3  1.896 
* 
Quartile 3  40  222  76.4  Q1 vs Q4  1.371    20  182  78.6  Q1 vs Q4  1.963 
** 
Quartile 4 (lowest)  40  214  84.4  Q2 vs Q3  0.274    19  181  74.2  Q2 vs Q3  1.586 
 
         Q2 vs Q4  0.681          Q2 vs Q4  1.647 
* 
         Q3 vs Q4  0.444          Q3 vs Q4  0.040 
 
 
Panel B: Bonus by leverage quartile (Post-Greenbury sample) 
Quartile 1 (highest)  32  78  39.4  Q1 vs Q2  0.096    15  70  34.2  Q1 vs Q2  -2.288 
** 
Quartile 2  32  77  43.8  Q1 vs Q3  -1.373    15  98  32.8  Q1 vs Q3  -1.457 
 
Quartile 3  32  92  42.1  Q1 vs Q4  -1.794 
*  14  90  39.3  Q1 vs Q4  -2.406 
*** 
Quartile 4 (lowest)  31  96  40.2  Q2 vs Q3  -1.396 
  14  102  37.2  Q2 vs Q3  0.592   
         Q2 vs Q4  -1.794 
*        Q2 vs Q4  -0.306   
         Q3 vs Q4  -0.385          Q3 vs Q4  -0.829   
  
Panel C: Option and long term incentive grants by leverage quartile (Post-Greenbury sample)   
Quartile 1 (highest)  30  35  30.7  Q1 vs Q2  -0.727    18  33  23.7  Q1 vs Q2  -0.641   
Quartile 2  30  41  33.1  Q1 vs Q3  0.835    18  40  39.8  Q1 vs Q3  1.295   
Quartile 3  30  29  24.6  Q1 vs Q4  -0.918    18  23  22.6  Q1 vs Q4  -1.115   
Quartile 4 (lowest)  30  42  28.3  Q2 vs Q3  1.593    17  44  33.5  Q2 vs Q3  1.575   
         Q2 vs Q4  -0.125          Q2 vs Q4  -0.322   
         Q3 vs Q4  -1.898          Q3 vs Q4  -2.161   
  
Panel D: Total cash remuneration (Pre-Greenbury sample)   
Quartile 1 (highest)  23  141  49.9  Q1 vs Q2  1.423    14  118  43.6  Q1 vs Q2  0.659   
Quartile 2  23  122  40.1  Q1 vs Q3  0.757    13  108  33.8  Q1 vs Q3  0.714   
Quartile 3  23  130  48.6  Q1 vs Q4  1.562    13  107  35.1  Q1 vs Q4  1.664 
* 
Quartile 4 (lowest)  22  120  39.9  Q2 vs Q3  -0.608    13  95  26.8  Q2 vs Q3  0.073   
        Q2 vs Q4  0.167          Q2 vs Q4  1.086   
        Q3 vs Q4  0.755          Q3 vs Q4  0.979   
 
 